War Makes the State?
November 7th, 2008Those theorists that Mann refers to as ‘militarists’ hold that warfare is the key to state formation. It is through the conquest of one people by another, and the resulting stratification of the new society, that the state arises. Otterbein rejects this argument; on the contrary, he argues, for both agriculture and the state to arise, there must be a long period during which warfare is rare or non-existent. The domestication of plants and animals can only occur in conditions of security. The storage of surplus production can only occur if people can be sure that the cache will be safe from predation.
Mann is also sceptical; after examining twenty-one case studies of the formation of early states, he concludes that while war is an important factor in a majority of cases, but that it intervened quite late in the process, when a high degree of social organization had already been achieved. Examining the case of Mesapotamia, one of the rare ‘pristine’ states, he finds little evidence for warfare during the early part of the process of state formation.
Charles Tilly famously wrote that “War makes the state, and the state makes war.” But Tilly was not talking about the pristine state, arising in the context of the neolithic revolution, but about the development of the modern territorial state in Western Europe. There was, he insisted, nothing inevitable about this; other pathways were open, and history might well have turned out differently. Nevertheless, under the conditions prevailing in Europe at that time, with warfare endemic, the nation-state turned out to be the most efficient form of social organisation, enabling the mobilisation and direction of peoples and economies for defence and aggression.
One of the elements in the mix will have been the forging of a collective belief-system or ideology; the most successful states were those that could persuade the young men to go and fight for them, rather than relying on mercenaries. As Benedict Anderson remarks, one of the most astonishing things about the modern nation state is that its citizens have been ready to die, giving up their lives in the pursuit of the aims of their leaders. Indeed, the very process of creating the nation state - a more recent development than the territorial state itself - was one for which people were willing to pay the supreme price. Anderson notes that a purely economic explanation of the national revolutions in South America stumbles over the fact that the creole elites who were most militant in the struggle came out of it having lost their sons and their property.
Warfare seems to play a double role in the forging of the modern state. On the one hand, it imposes a certain set of organisational imperatives, with strengthened centres of command and a strong bureaucracy, both on the armed services themselves and upon the polity that directs them. On the other, it forges a consciousness of solidarity upon the underlying population, a sense of a common identity in opposition to colonial overlords or belligerent neighbours. This sense of solidarity crosses class lines, and is instrumental in the development of popular democracy and, ultimately, of the welfare state.
Which leaves us with a question. As people become less willing to die for the nation - and this seems to be the case in the West - and as the mass warfare of modernity gives way to the guerilla and the terrorist, will those who hold the central levers of power see any reason to continue the process of democratisation, or th maintenance of current systems of welfare? One of Margaret Thatcher’s favourite bedtime books was Corelli Barnett’s ‘The Audit of War’, the gist of which was that government attempts to meet the nation’s demands for social equity in the wake of World War Two had been far too costly, and had definitively lost Britain its place in the world. If it is no longer necessary to call up the nation’s young men en masse to fight and die, the contract underlying the nation state may have lost its interest for the ruling class.